与公司治理有关的文献综述，公司治理英文缩写

Literature Review of Corporate Governance Mechanism

关于公司治理机制的文献综述

Corporate governance, as an important factor affecting the corporate business activities, is closely linked to investment efficiency. In 1976, Jensen and Meckling proposed the theory of ownership structure in his book Business Theory: Manager Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, making it clear that the conflict of interest between the principal (owner) and the agent (operator) in the contractual relationship is an agency problem within the enterprise. Holmstrom (1995) pointed out that the issue of principal-agent and contractual incompleteness is a necessary condition for the existence of corporate governance problems in modern enterprises. The essence of agency problem is the state of separation of ownership and control of modern enterprises. Corporate governance becomes a new solution when agency issues cannot be resolved perfectly through contracts [33]. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the essence of corporate governance is the agency problem caused by the separation of ownership and control. It is an institutional arrangement that ensures the safety of capital invested and returns to investment [12].

公司治理作为影响公司经营活动的重要因素，与投资效率之间有着密切的联系。1976年Jensen与Meckling在其著作《企业理论：管理者行为、代理成本与所有权结构》中提出所有权结构理论，把契约关系中委托人（所有者）与代理人（经营者）之间的利益冲突明确成为企业内部的代理问题。Holmstrom(1995)指出委托代理问题和契约不完全性是现代企业公司治理问题存在的必要条件。代理问题本质是现代企业的所有权与控制权相分离的状态。当代理问题不能通过契约得到完美解决时，公司治理成为新的解决途径 [33]。Shleifer与Vishny(1997)也认为，公司治理的实质问题是所有权与控制权分离造成的代理问题，它是一种制度安排，能确保投资者的资金安全并得到投资回报[12]。

The mechanism of corporate governance consists of internal governance mechanism and external governance mechanism. Denis and Mcconnel (2003) thought that corporate governance is an organic whole that is made up of internal and external governance mechanisms of the enterprises. It can promote the corporate controller to maximize the interests of the corporate in decision-making as a guideline to avoid inefficient investment [2]. Among them, internal governance mechanism includes equity structure, board governance, managerial incentives and other aspects; while external governance mechanism usually includes government intervention, the level of the rule of law and financial levels.

公司治理机制由内部治理机制和外部治理机制构成。Denis与Mcconnel(2003)认为公司治理由企业内、外部治理机制组合而成的一个有机整体。它可以促使公司控制者在决策时以公司利益最大化为行动准则，从而避免非效率投资[2]其中内部治理机制主要包括股权结构、董事会治理、经理层激励等方面；而外部治理机制通常包括政府干预、法治水平和金融水平来进行研究。

Based on the research topic of this paper, this paper mainly reviews and analyzes literature related to the impact of internal governance mechanism, external governance mechanism (mainly government intervention) and government intervention by means of internal governance on enterprise investment efficiency in order to provide a research perspective and lay the foundation for this study.

基于本文的研究主题，本文主要就企业内部治理机制对企业投资效率的影响，外部治理环境主要从研究政府干预对企业投资效率的影响，政府干预通过公司内部治理对公司投资效率的影响等相关文献进行回顾和分析，以便为本文提供研究视角和奠定研究基础。

(I) The Impact of Internal Governance Mechanism on Enterprise Investment Efficiency

(一) 内部治理机制对企业投资效率的影响

Internal governance is a system of management and control within the corporate and is an important indicator of the direction of the corporate decision-making. It not only regulates the distribution of responsibilities and rights of various participants of the corporate, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, it also defines the rules and procedures that should be followed in the decision-making of corporate affairs. If a corporate internal governance is flawed, it will inevitably affect the corporate investment efficiency. So far, domestic and foreign scholars have studied the impact of internal governance on the corporate investment efficiency and formed a wealth of research results. This section will analyze mainly from the three aspects: First, the corporate equity structure and the corporate efficiency investment; second, the corporate board governance characteristics and the corporate investment efficiency; third, the corporate managerial incentives and corporate investment efficiency.

公司内部治理是对公司内部进行管理和控制的体系，是体现公司经营决策指导方向的重要标志，其不仅规定了公司的各个参与者，例如，董事会、经理层、股东和其他利害相关者的责任和权力分布，而且也明确了决策公司事务时所应遵循的规则和程序。如果一个公司内部治理有缺陷，其必然会影响公司的投资效率。至今为止，国内外学者研究了公司内部治理对公司投资效率的影响，形成了丰富的研究成果。本小节主要从三个方面进行分析：一是公司股权结构与公司效率投资；二是公司董事会治理特征与公司投资效率；三是公司管理层激励特征与公司投资效率。

(1) Equity Structure and Investment Efficiency

(1) 股权结构与投资效率

Equity structure is the foundation of the internal governance mechanism of the enterprise, which determines the risk share and the benefit distribution mechanism of the enterprise. Therefore, it has an important influence on the investment efficiency of the enterprise. In the broad sense, the equity structure includes three aspects: equity nature, equity concentration and equity balance. ①Study on the relationship between the concentration of equity and inefficient investment of enterprises. Foreign studies such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Pound (1988) etal. show that equity concentration or major shareholders control can inhibit the over-investment behavior of enterprises, but the empirical results by Wei and Yi Zhang (2008) finds that: when the cash flow rights (equity) of the major shareholders are relatively high, it can effectively inhibit the company's over-investment behavior, and when the separation degree of the cash flow rights and control rights of the major shareholders is high, it means the over-investment behavior has deteriorated. Domestic studies on the relationship between equity concentration and enterprise investment efficiency are mainly linear relationship, negative linear relationship, U-type relationship, inverted U-type relationship and N-type relationship.

股权结构是企业内部治理机制的基础，决定了企业的风险承担与利益分配机制，因而股权结构对企业投资效率产生重要影响。广义上，股权结构包括股权性质、股权集中度和股权制衡度三个方面。（１）股权集中度与企业非效率投资的关系研究。国外的研究表明股权集中或大股东控制可以抑制企业的过度投资行为，如Ｊｅｎｓｅｎ和Ｍｅｃｋｌｉｎｇ（１９７６）、Ｐｏｕｎｄ（１９８８）ｅｔａｌ．但Ｗｅｉ和ＹｉＺｈａｎｇ（２００８）的实证结果发现：当大股东的现金流权即股权较高时，能够有效抑制公司过度投资行为，而当大股东现金流权与控制权分离度较高时，公司的过度投资程度变得恶化。国内文献关于股权集中度与企业投资效率之间的关系主要表现为正线性关系、负线性关系、Ｕ型关系、倒Ｕ型关系和Ｎ型关系五种。

Bozec and Laurin (2008) pointed out that the shareholding of the largest shareholder is proportional to the dominance of ownership, and at the same time, it enhances its motivation of pursuing personal interests by making use of the control right [34]. La Porta et al. (2000) found that the major shareholders have direct control right. In addition, they can achieve their personal interests through controlling the board or transfer the company’s resources through related transactions, additional shares, asset acquisitions, etc. directly or indirectly [35].

Bozec与Laurin(2008)指出第一大股东的持股比例与其拥有的可支配权呈正比，同时，也使其利用控制权谋取私人利益的动机增强[34]。La Porta et.al(2000)发现，大股东具有直接行权能力，同时，也可通过控制董事会来实现其个人利益，或者通过关联交易、增发股票、资产收购等直接或间接的方式转移公司资源[35]。

Holmen and Hogfeldt (2009) conducted empirical research on the structure of control (separation of management rights and ownership), and found that major shareholders can control the corporate by using a relatively small amount of investment, which may lead to serious over-investment behavior of enterprises and it will increase along with the increase of the separation degree of the management rights and ownership [4]. Albuquerue and Wang (2008) proposed that the controlling shareholders are more likely to have the motivation of over-investment in order to seek their own interests when the investor protection mechanism is not perfect [5]. Cho (1988), Pindado and Torre (2009) found that excessive concentration of ownership would increase the investment risk of enterprises and there is a non-linear relationship between ownership structure and enterprise investment efficiency [6,7].

Holmen与Hogfeldt（2009）对控制权结构（经营权和所有权分离）进行了实证研究，研究发现大股东可以利用相对很少的投资来控制大量公司，这很可能使企业存在严重的过度投资行为，并且过度投资行为随着经营权与所有权分离程度的增大而加剧[4]。Albuquerue与Wang（2008）提出控股股东为谋取自身利益，在投资者保护机制不完善的情况下，更有进行过度投资的动机[5]。Cho（1988）、Pindado与Torre（2009）等发现所有权过度集中会增加企业的投资风险，所有权结构与企业投资效率之间存在非线性关系[6,7]。

Cheng XX et al. (2009) also studied the relationship between equity structure and investment behavior of listed companies. It was found that with the increase of the proportion of controlling shareholders, the interests of controlling shareholders tend to be consistent with those of small and medium shareholders, which may inhibit the over-investment behavior. Meanwhile, the study also found that the positive governance role of the local government resulting from the increase of the proportion of holdings will be reduced as a result of its excessive intervention in the corporate when it is the controlling shareholder. [51]

程XX等（2009）也对股权结构与上市公司投资行为的关系进行研究，结果发现，随着控股股东持股比例的增加，控股股东与中小股东利益趋于一致，可以抑制过度投资行为。同时，研究也发现地方政府作为控股股东时因其对公司过多干预行为会减弱持股比例上升所带来的积极治理作用。[51]

Studies of Jian XXg and Yin XX(2010), Li XX (2013) found that the phenomenon of over-investment exists in China's state-owned listed companies, and the more concentrated ownership of state-owned listed companies, the more serious the phenomenon of over-investment; Xie X (2012) believed that there is a N-shaped curvilinear relationship between the holdings of the major shareholders and the level of over-investment. Wei X and Shi X (2013) found that the higher the proportion of shares of the largest shareholder, the higher the degree of investment expenditure and over-investment, the lower the level of under-investment [14].

间XX和殷XX（２０１０）、李XX（２０１３）的研究均发现，我国国有上市公司存在过度投资现象，且股权越集中的国有上市公司投资过度现象越严重；谢X（2012）认为大股东持股与过度投资水平呈“N”型曲线关系[10]韦X和石X（2013）研究认为第一大股东持股比例越高，投资支出水平和过度投资水平越高，投资不足水平越低[14]。

Liu X and Dou X (2009) ’ s study showed that inefficient investment behavior of over-investment and under-investment exists in enterprises under the control of major shareholders who pursue private interests of control. Chen X (2009)’s study showed that there is a U-type relationship between equity concentration and investment efficiency and Zhao X (2010) also found that there is a U-type relationship between equity concentration and over-investment of the company, but Zhang X et al. (2008) found that there is an inverted U-type relationship between the proportion of the largest shareholder and investment efficiency. And the research result of An X et al. (2008) proved that there is an N-type relationship between the company’s inefficient investment behavior and the actual control of the largest shareholder.

刘X和窦X（２００９）的研究则表明，大股东为了追求控制权私有收益，在大股东控制下的企业同时存在过度投资与投资不足两种非效率投资行为。陈X（２００９）的研究表明股权集中度与投资效率存在Ｕ型关系，赵X（２０１０）研究结果也表明股权集中度与公司的过度投资存在Ｕ型关系，但张X等（２００８）的研究发现第一大股东持股比例与投资效率呈倒Ｕ型关系，而安X等（２００８）的研究结果则发现公司非效率投资行为与第一大股东的实际控制力呈Ｎ型关系。

(2) Study on the relationship between equity balance and inefficient investment research. Luo XX et al. (2008) believed that when the proportion of large shareholders is relatively small, the equity balance mechanism can effectively curb the over-investment behavior of managers [9] and An X et al. (2008 ) found that under the interests of the major shareholders, the equity balance can inhibit the over-investment behavior, but excessive equity balance will lead to the problem of under-investment [15]. However, the empirical results of Li X (2013) showed that the effect of equity balance mechanism formed by the second to the fifth largest shareholders on inefficient investment is not significant [17].

(2) 股权制衡度与非效率投资的关系研究，罗XX等（2008）认为在大股东持股比例较小时，股权制衡机制能够有效抑制管理者的过度投资行为[9]，安X等（2008）研究发现在大股东利益主导下，股权制衡度可以抑制过度投资行为，但过度的股权制衡会产生投资不足问题[15]。但李X（2013）实证结果表明由第二到第五大股东持股形成的股权制衡机制对非效率投资的影响不显著[17]。

Pagano and Roell (1998) found that mutual supervision between multiple shareholders can inhibit the behavior of capital occupation of large shareholders [15]. Maury and Pajuste (2005) pointed out that equity balance has a significant inhibitory effect on the infringement of large shareholders and are proportional to the company's operating performance and corporate value [37]. Attig et al. (2013) found that equity balance can effectively curb the company's inefficient investment behavior. Li XX (2013) found that equity balance not only effectively curbs over-investment behavior of enterprises, it also mitigates the impact of private ownership of control on the over-investment behavior of enterprises, but the impact on under-investment is not significant. The study of Chi XX and Zou X (2014) found that the equity balance is proportional to inefficient investment. Namely, there is collusion between the major shareholders.

Pagano与Roell（1998）研究发现，多个股东之间的互相监督能对大股东的资金占用行为起抑制作用[15]。Maury与Pajuste(2005)指出，股权制衡对大股东的侵害行为具有明显的抑制作用，并与公司经营业绩和企业价值呈正比[37]。Ａｔｔｉｇｅｔａｌ．（2013）的研究发现股权制衡有效抑制了公司的非效率投资行为。李XX（2013）则发现，股权制衡不仅有效抑制了企业的过度投资行为，而且能缓解控制权私有收益对企业过度投资行为的影响，但对投资不足的影响却不显著。池XX和邹X（2014）的研究更是发现股权制衡度与非效率投资正相关即各大股东之间存在合谋现象。

(3) Study on the relationship between the nature of the controlling shareholder and inefficient investment. Liu XX (2006) argued that the holding of the manager of the legal person holding company is more effective than the state-owned holding company in controlling the over-investment behavior [20]. Chen X (2009) showed that state-owned legal person shares play a significant role in promoting the governance of inefficient investment behavior of enterprises [21]. Li X (2013) also came to a similar conclusion that the investment efficiency of state-owned listed enterprises is lower than that of non-state-owned listed companies and the phenomenon of inefficient investment is more serious [17]. An X et al. (2008), Cheng XX and Xia XX (2009) found that compared with that of central government-owned state-owned companies, the over-investment behavior of local government-owned state-owned companies is more serious. And the effect of equity balance of listed companies directly under the central government and the provincial government is relatively poor.

（3）研究控股股东性质与非效率投资的关系方面，刘XX（2006）认为法人控股公司管理人持股比国有持股公司在相应情况下能更有效的控制过度投资行为[20]。陈X（2009）国有法人股在治理企业非效率投资行为时起到明显促进作用[21]。李X（2013）也得出相似结论，即第一大股东是国有性质的上市企业的投资效率要低于非国有性质的上市公司，非效率投资的现象更严重[17]。安X等（２００８）、程XX与夏XX（２００９）等的研究则发现，相较于中央政府控股的国有公司而言，地方政府国有控股公司的过度投资行为更严重。中央直属和省级政府所属上市公司的股权制衡效果相对较差。

In summary, this paper summarizes the relationship between equity concentration, equity balance, the nature of controlling shareholder and inefficient investment from the study of relationship between domestic equity structure and inefficient investment. It can be found that different scholars have different conclusions about the relationship between equity concentration, equity balance and over-investment or under-investment with different focuses. However, the conclusions they come to on the relationship between the nature of controlling shareholder and inefficient investment are roughly the same. That is, state-owned shares can not effectively improve the inefficient investment, while legal person shares can inhibit inefficient investment. In order to facilitate comparison, this paper will review them separately, but in actual study, they are usually put together to form the variables to analyze the relationship between the equity structure and inefficient investment.

综上所述：从国内股权结构与非效率投资关系的研究中，本文分别从股权集中度，股权制衡度，控股股东性质与非效率投资的关系进行综述。可以发现不同学者针对股权集中度，股权制衡机制与过度投资或投资不足之间的关系得出的结论不尽相同，研究的方面也各有侧重。但对控股股东性质与非效率投资的关系中得出的结论大致相同，即国有股不能有效改善非效率投资，法人股可以抑制非效率投资。为了便于比较，本文将它们分开进行综述，但实际进行研究时往往将它们结合在一起构成分析股权结构与非效率投资关系的变量。

Since the equity structure is the root of corporate governance, the right medicine is the fundamental solution. Through continuous verification of domestic and foreign scholars, the proportion of the largest shareholder and the degree of equity balance is identified as an important factor affecting the level of corporate governance. Bozec and Laurin (2008) pointed out that the shareholding of the largest shareholder is proportional to the dominance of ownership, and at the same time, it enhances its motivation of pursuing personal interests by making use of the control right [34]. Grzegorz and Pwlina (2005), by studying the UK listed companies, pointed out that the appropriate proportion of the internal equity of the company has a better incentive effect, which can reduce the investment - cash flow sensitivity coefficient [36]. Pagano and Roell (1998) found that mutual supervision between multiple shareholders can inhibit the behavior of capital occupation of large shareholders [15]. Maury and Pajuste (2005) pointed out that equity balance has a significant inhibitory effect on the infringement of large shareholders and are proportional to the company's operating performance and corporate value [37].

既然股权结构是公司治理产生的根源，对症下药是根本解决之道，第一大股东持股比例以及股权制衡度经过国内外学者的不断验证，而被确定为影响公司治理水平的重要因素。Bozec与Laurin(2008)指出第一大股东的持股比例与其拥有的可支配权呈正比，同时，也使其利用控制权谋取私人利益的动机增强[34]。La Porta et.al(2000)发现，大股东具有直接行权能力，同时，也可通过控制董事会来实现其个人利益，或者通过关联交易、增发股票、资产收购等直接或间接的方式转移公司资源[35]。Grzegorz与 Pwlina（2005）通过对英国上市公司的研究，指出适当比例的内部股权对公司具有较好的激励效果，可以降低投资—现金流敏感系数[36]。Pagano与Roell（1998）研究发现，多个股东之间的互相监督能对大股东的资金占用行为起抑制作用[15]。Maury与Pajuste(2005)指出，股权制衡对大股东的侵害行为具有明显的抑制作用，并与公司经营业绩和企业价值呈正比[37]。

(2) Characteristics and Investment Efficiency of the Board

(2) 董事会治理特征与投资效率

The composition of the board of directors includes the size of the board of directors, the structure of the board of directors (the proportion of independent directors) and the positions of the chairman and general manager. The study of the impact of board composition on the efficiency of enterprise investment is also focused on these three aspects. ① The impact of the size of the board on enterprise investment efficiency. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found that the size of the board should be moderate instead of pursuing big size, which may result in redundant staff, lacking in cohesion and become a subsidiary controlled by the management. The lack of supervision and management functions of the board will easily cause more intense motivation of the management’s pursuing personal interests. And the company's investment decisions will no longer follow the optimal investment efficiency [39]. The existing literature shows that there are mainly three types of relations between the size of the board and enterprise investment efficiency: First, the size of the board is positively related to the enterprise investment efficiency. For example, empirical research of Huang XX and Dong X (2010) showed that the size of the board is positively related to the input of research and development of the company. Second, the size of the board is negatively correlated with enterprise investment efficiency; Third, there is a non-linear relationship between the board and enterprise investment efficiency. For example, the study of Zhao X (2010) indicated that there is a U-shaped relationship between the size of the board and the company's over-investment. ② The impact of independent directors on enterprise investment efficiency. In theory, compared with internal directors, independent directors are independent of the interests of enterprises and managers, and therefore people can be free from the worry of retaliation and constrained by the reputation mechanism. Therefore, the managers will be effectively supervised, thus inhibiting the behavior of enterprise inefficient investment. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) found that independent directors are more independent than internal directors in the board's investment decision-making meetings, so they can better supervise managers, and curb the blind investment behavior of corporate decision makers to prevent inefficient investment [16]. Richardson (2006) studied corporate governance, free cash flow and over-investment, and found that institutional investor holdings and independent director systems could be an effective measure to curb the behavior of inefficient over-investment [28]. There are mainly two empirical conclusions on the effect of independent directors on enterprise investment efficiency: First, independent directors significantly inhibit the over-investment of enterprises, such as Li XX (2013); Second, independent directors fail to effectively inhibit the over-investment behavior of enterprises, such as Tang XX et al. (2007), Guo X and Wang X (2012). And Zhao X (2010) found that there is not significant positive correlation between independent directors and over-investment of the company. Third, the impact of the two positions on enterprise investment efficiency. The two positions referring to the chairman and general manager can be divided into two types: combination and separation of the two positions. In theory, the combination of the two positions are conducive to improving the degree of freedom of innovation of business managers, but also may reduce the supervisory role of senior management team, encourage the managerial opportunistic motive, thus increasing the degree of overinvestment or underinvestment; while separation of the two positions has enhanced the supervisory role of the board of directors, thus reducing the non-investment behavior of the management. It depends on the financial environment in which it is held to decide which form is better (Li X, 2008), that is, the effectiveness of the two positions is affected by different factors, and the empirical conclusions are not consistent. Brickley (1997) and others found that the performance of the board of directors and the general manager of the two-in-one performance of the company with the combination of the two positions is nor worse than that separated. Rather, the investment efficiency is even higher [25]. The empirical research of Goyal (2002) and others found that the separation of the two positions in the company is more conducive to corporate governance, which can effectively supervise the behavior of general manager [26]. Zhao X's (2010) study showed that the combination of the two positions will significantly improve the company's overinvestment, and Lee's (2008) study found that there is no significant difference between the companies with the combination and separation of the two positions in terms of the investment behavior. Li XX (2013) also found that the effect of separation of the chairman and the general manager on curbing the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises is not obvious.

董事会组成主要包括董事会规模、董事会结构即独立董事占比及董事长与总经理两职设置三个方面。关于董事会组成对企业投资效率影响的研究也主要围绕这三个方面来展开。(1) 董事会规模对企业投资效率的影响。Lipton与Lorsch（1992）研究发现，董事会规模应适中，不宜片面追求大董事会而造成人员冗余、凝聚力涣散而沦为管理层控制的附属机构，董事会监督管理职能的缺失易导致管理层谋取私利的动机更加强烈，公司的投资决策将不再遵循最优的投资效率[39]。现有文献表明董事会规模与企业投资效率间的关系表现为以下三种：一是董事会规模与企业投资效率呈正相关关系，如黄XX和董X（２０１０）的实证研究表明，董事会规模与公司研发投入显著正相关；二是董事会规模与企业投资效率呈负相关关系；Ｈ是董事会与企业投资效率呈非线性关系，如赵X（２０１０）的研究表明董事会规模与公司的过度投资存在Ｕ形关系。（２）独立董事对企业投资效率的影响。理论上，与内部董事相比，独立董事独立于企业利益与经理层，因而不担必打击报复，且受到声誉机制的制约，因而可Ｗ更有效地对经理实施监督，从而抑制企业非效率投资行为的发生。Gugler与Yurtoglu(2003)研究发现独立董事在董事会投资决策会议中比内部董事的独立性更强，更能对经理人员实施监督，能遏制企业决策者的盲目投资行为，防止非效率投资[16]，Richardson（2006）对公司治理和自由现金流量与过度投资行为进行了研究，发现机构投资者持股和独立董事制度可以作为抑制非效率过度投资行为的有效措施[28]。关于独立董事对企业投资效率影响的实证结论主要有两种：一是独立董事显著地抑制了企业的过度投资斤为，如李XX（２０１３）；二是独立董事并未有效抑制企业的过度投资行为，如唐XX等（２００７）、郭X和王X（２０１２）等，赵X（２０１０）更是发现独立董事与公司过度投资呈不显著的正相关关系。（３）两职设置对企业投资效率的影响。两职设置指董事长与总经理的人员设置，又分为两职合一和两职分离。理论上，两职合一有利于提高企业管理人员的创新自由度，同时也可能降低对高层管理团队的监督作用，助长经理层的机会主义动机，从而加剧企业过度投资或投资不足的程度；而两职分离的情形下，增强了董事长对管理层的监督作用，从而减少管理层的非投资行为。具体哪种形式更好，要视所处的金融环境而定（李X，２００８），即两职设置的有效性受不同因素的影响，因而实证结论也不尽一致。Brickley（1997）等人则研究发现董事长与总经理两职合一的公司业绩并没有比两职分离的公司业绩差，而且投资效率更高[25]。Goyal（2002）等人实证研究发现公司中两职分离更有利于公司治理，能够有效监督总经理的行为[26]。赵X（２０１０）的研究表明两职合一显著地提高了公司的过度投资程度，而李X（２００８）的研究发现两职合一和两职分离的公司在投资行为上没有表现出显著差异性，李XX（２０１３）的研究也发现总经理和董事长的分离对抑制企业非效率投资行为的作用不显著。

(3) Incentive Characteristics of the Managerial and Investment Efficiency

(3) 管理层激励特征与投资效率

The managerial, as the performer and risk-taker of the company’s business activities, has the needs of the realization of personal values and access to risk compensation. If the remuneration obtained does not match the risks undertaken, it will be induced to seek risk remuneration and damage the company’s overall interests through abnormal ways. In addition, even if the remuneration is reasonable, the profitability nature of the rational economic man will lead to the pursuit of personal interests. The managerial incentives can be divided into explicit incentives and implicit incentives. The formers mainly include monetary remuneration incentives and equity incentives, the latter means employment consumption and job promotion. The following part will review literature related to monetary remuneration incentives, equity incentives, employment consumption, job promotion and corporate investment behavior.

管理层作为公司经营活动的执行者和风险承担者，有实现个人价值和获取风险补偿的需要若获取的报酬与承担的风险不匹配，则会诱使其通过非正常的途径寻找风险补偿而损害企业整体利益。不仅如此，既使报酬合理，理性经济人的趋利性也会导致谋取私利的行为。管理层激励可分为显性激励和隐性激励，显性激励主要包括货币薪酬激励和股权激励，隐性激励则指在职消费和职位晋升。下面分别回顾货币薪酬激励、股权激励、在职消费和职位晋升与企业投资行为的相关文献。

①The effect of the monetary remuneration incentives on the enterprise investment efficiency. No conclusion has been drawn by domestic and foreign scholars on the effect of the monetary remuneration incentives on the enterprise investment efficiency. Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996) examined the impact of the remuneration of senior executives in the US on corporate investment decision-making and the result showed that the remuneration sensitivity is directly proportional to higher investment opportunities; Grundy and Li (2010) found that the monetary remuneration incentives of senior executives have nothing to do with the investment level of enterprises. Ma X (2013) discovered that the monetary remuneration incentives of senior executives in listed companies in China’s manufacturing industry have a significant constraint effect on over-investment. However, it fails to play an appropriate role in inefficient investment [65]. Cai XX (2009) found that over-investment has a significant positive correlation with the manager’s monetary remuneration in companies with higher free cash flow; Jian XX et al. (2011) indicated that there is a positive correlation between the degree of over-investment and monetary incentive level of the managerial. Xia XX’s study (2012) showed that senior executives’ monetary remuneration incentives and stock mispricing, executive holdings and overvalued share prices have had an interactive effect on the investment behavior of enterprises [64]. However, the empirical results of Xin XX et al. (2007) found that in general, the monetary remuneration of the managerial is negatively correlated with over-investment and its relation with under-investment is not obvious; and Lin XX’s study (2013) indicated that the level of monetary remuneration incentives is negatively correlated with both over-investment and under-investment; Xia X and Qiu XX’s study (2014) also found that there is a signification negative correlation between monetary remuneration and inefficient investment.

(1) 货币薪酬激励对企业投资效率的影响。货币薪酬激励对企业投资效率的影响结果，国内外学者的研究成果尚无定论。Ｂａｂｅｒ、Ｊａｎａｋｉｒａｍａｎ与Kang（１９９６）考察了美国高管人员薪酬对企业投资决策行为的影响，结果表明高管人员薪酬敏感度与较高的投资机会成正比；Ｇｒｕｎｄｙ与Ｌｉ（２０１０）的研究则发现高管货币薪酬与企业投资水平无关。马X（2013）研究发现我国制造业上市公司高管的货币薪酬激励对过度投资有显著制约作用，高管股权激励对我国制造业上市公司的非效率投资没有起到应有的制约作用[65]。蔡XX（２００９）的研究发现，自由现金流较高的公司，过度投资与经理货币薪酬显著正相关；简XX等（２０１１）的研究表明，过度投资程度与企业经理层的货币激励水平呈正相关关系。夏XX（2012）研究发现高管货币性薪酬激励和股票错误定价，高管持股和股价高估都对企业的投资行为产生交互效应[64]。但辛XX等（２００７）的实证结果发现：整体而言，经理货币薪酬与过度投资显著负相关而与投资不足关系不明显；而林XX（２０１３）的结果发现：货币薪酬激励水平与过度投资和投资不足都显著负相关；夏X和邱XX（２０１４）的研究也发现，货币薪酬与非效率投资呈显著负相关关系。

② The impact of equity incentives on investment efficiency of enterprises. There are two kinds of effects of equity incentives in ensuring the interests of the shareholders: one is interest convergence effect and other is management defense effect. Jensen and Meckling (1976) held that low proportion of managers will promote the consistency of interests of managers and shareholders with the increase of the proportion of shareholders due to the principle of cost sharing, thus reducing the cost of agency of both sides, i.e., realizing interest convergence effect; but with the increase of the proportion of shareholders, various constraints will be ineffective to the managers with firm status and holding the share exceeding a certain level, so the managers will invest in the projects benefiting themselves while damaging the interests of others to maximize their own interest, i.e., management defense effect. Therefore, the effectiveness of equity incentives depends on the comparison of these two effects. Hanlock (1998) found that equity incentives will increase the sensitivity of corporate investment and cash flow, which indicates that equity incentives not only fail to play its stimulating role, it makes the problem of over-investment of enterprises more serious; Vishny et al. (1988) found that there is an inverted U-shape correlation between the proportion of shares held by senior executives and investment level of enterprises [44].

(2) 股权激励对企业投资效率的影响。在保障股东利益中股权激励具有两种效应：一是利益趋同效应，二是管理防御效应。Ｊｅｎｓｅｎ与Ｍｅｃｋｌｉｎｇ（１９７６）认为在经理持股比例较低时，随着经理持股比例的増加，因成本共担原则，将促进经理与股东利益的一致性，从而降低两者之间的代理成本，即实现利益趋同效应；但随着经理持股比例的提高，当其超过某一水平时，经理的地位非常牢固，各种约束机制对其失效，经理便会为了自身利益最大化而投资一些损人利己的项目，即为管理防御效应。因此，股权激励的有效性取决于这两种效应的对比结果。Ｈａｄｌｏｃｋ（１９９８）的研究结果发现，股权激励增强了公司投资与现金流敏感性，表明股权激励不仅没有发挥激励效应，反而使得企业的过度投资问题更加严重；Vishny等（1988）研究发现高管持股比例与企业的投资水平呈倒“U”型的相关关系[44]。

The empirical results of Grundy and Li (2010) also showed that there is a strong positive correlation between the proportion of shares held by senior executives and the investment level. But most of the Western empirical studies also support that equity incentives will effectively curb the behavior of enterprise inefficient investment. Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) pointed out that the shareholding of the managerial will help to constrain speculation in enterprises, follow business rules that maximize corporate value and reduce inefficient investment behavior [42].

Ｇｒｕｎｄｙ与Ｌｉ（２０１０）的实证结果也发现高管持股与投资水平显著正相关。但西方大部分实证结论支持股权激励有效抑制了企业非效率投资行为。Palia与 Lichtenberg(1999)指出，管理层持股有助于约束企业的投机行为，遵循企业价值最大化的经营准则。减低非效率投资行为[42]。

Denis et al. (1997), Broussard et al. (2004), Pawlina and Renneboog (2005), Tang XX et al. (2007) and Zhang XX and Yang XX (2012) found that shareholding of the managerial stock option incentives can curb the behavior of over-investment of companies; but Cui X (2006), Luo XX et al. (2008), Lv XX and Zhang XX (2011) and Xu XX and Zhang XX (2012) found that equity incentives can increase the enterprise investment efficiency in general and curb over-investment and under-investment of enterprises and the promoting role of shareholding incentives of non-government controlled enterprises is more evident that those of government controlled enterprises [60-63]. However, Lin XX (2013) argued that the level of equity incentives is significantly negatively correlated with under-investment, while its relation with over-investment is negative but not significant; and Jian XX et al. (2011) also proved the relation between equity incentives and over-investment is insignificant.

Ｄｅｎｉｓｅｔａｌ．（１９９７）、Ｂｒｏｕｓｓａｒｄｅｔａｌ．（２００４）、Ｐａｗｌｉｎａ与Ｒｅｎｎｅｂｏｏｇ（２００５）、唐XX等（２００７）、张XX和杨XX（２０１２）的研究发现经理层持股或股票期权激励显著地抑制了公司的过度投资行为；崔X（2006），罗XX等（2008），吕XX和张XX（2011），徐XX和张XX（2012）研究却发现股权激励总体上能够提高企业的投资效率，抑制企业的过度投资和投资不足，但非政府控制的企业持股激励比政府控制的企业持股激励对投资效率的促进作用更显著[60-63]。而林XX（２０１３）的结果发现，股权激励水平与投资不足显著负相关，与过度投资负相关但不显著；简XX等（２０１１）的实证结果也表明股权激励与过度投资不显著。

(II) The Impact of External Governance Mechanism of the Company on the Investment Efficiency

(二) 公司外部治理机制对公司投资效率的影响

Enterprise inefficient investment, which generally includes over-investment and under-investment, has always been the focus of academic research. Unlike the external environment of Western enterprises, enterprises in China, featuring different resource endowment and imbalance of economic development, differ from Western enterprises in terms of political and institutional background, market and rule of law supervision, etc. and present quite a lot of “Chinese characteristics”, resulting in significance differences in the external governance environment of various regions in China. In recent years, foreign scholars have begun to pay attention to the study on the impact of external governance environment with Chinese characteristics on enterprise investment behavior. Khannn and Palepu (1997) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) believed that during economic transition or in the emerging market economy, institutional factors have a more profound impact on enterprise investment behavior than the market mechanism, especially in the early stage of transition, which is more critical. A series of studies of La Porta et al. found a country’s corporate decision-making is significantly influenced by the country’s legal system and government intervention. The research transfers the perspective to the most fundamental factors influencing corporate governance and these fundamental factors constitute the external governance environment in which the company is located (Xia XX and Fang XX, 2005).

企业非效率投资一直都是学界研究所关注的问题，一般包括过度投资与投资不足。不同于西方企业的外部环境，由于资源禀赋的差异与经济发展的不平衡，中国企业在政治与制度背景、市场与法治监管等多个方面均有别于西方企业，并表现出相当多的“中国特色”，导致了我国各个地区的外部治理环境存在明显差异。近年来，国外学者开始关注中国特色的外部治理环境对企业投资行为的影响研究。Ｋｈａｎｎａ与Ｐａｌｅｐｕ（１９９７）和Ｋｈａｎｎａ以及Ｒｉｖｋｉｎ（２００１）认为经济转型期或新兴市场经济中，制度性因素比市场机制更为深刻地影响着企业投资行为，尤其是在转型初期，这种影响则更为关键。ＬａＰｏｒｔａｅｔａｌ．的一系列研究发现，一个国家的公司经营决策显著地受到该国的法律体系和政府干预的影响，这一研究把研究视角转移到影响公司治理的最根本因素上来，这些根本因素则构成了公司所处的外部治理环境（夏XX与方XX，２００５）。

Shleifer and Vishny (1998) specialize in the research of the role of government in economy. Government officials will, based on their own political stance, use their political power to intervene in the enterprises under their control and promote the enterprises to invest in inefficient investment. They thought the roles of the government in economy mainly include night watchman, helper and plundering hand. Political connection and political risk also has an important impact on the business enterprises (Faccio, 2010; Boubakri et al. 2011). An empirical study of Faccio (2010) showed that enterprises with political connection have higher asset liability ratios and lower tax burdens and lower asset-benefit laws and market valuations; and compared with countries with lower degree of corruption and the behavior of officials strictly bound, the political connection of enterprises in countries with serious corruption and lower binding of government officials is relatively less.

Ｓｈｌｅｉｆｅｒ与Ｖｉｓｈｎｙ（１９９８）则专门研究了政府在经济中的作用，政府官员会基于自己的政治立场，利用自己政治权力干预其控制的企业，促使企业进行一些低效投资。并认为政府在经济中扮演的角色主要有守夜人、帮助之手、掠夺之手３种。政治联系和政治风险也对企业的经营活动有着重要影响（Ｆａｃｃｉｏ，２０１０；Ｂｏｕｂａｋｒｉｅｔａｌ．２０１１）。Ｆａｃｃｉｏ（２０１０）的实证研究表明，存在政治关联的企业有较高的资产负债率和较低的税收负担，但却有较低的资产收益法和市场估值水平；并且相对于腐败程度较低、官员行为受到严格约束的国家而言，腐败行为严重和政府官员约束力较低的国家，其公司的政治关联现象较少。

Boubakri et al. (2011) found that there is a stronger negative correlation between the state-owned equity ratio and the risk-taking level of enterprises with higher political plundering environments than those in lower political plundering environments. This shows that a better governance environment is conducive to improving the willingness to take risks of state-owned enterprises. Bai et al. (2006) ’s study showed that under the intervention of government and officials, China's state-owned listed companies, in order to provide more jobs, pay more taxes and other purposes, over-investment. Chen et al. (2011) also found that government intervention will reduce the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Inspired by the studies of Western scholars on the external governance environment, scholars in China will apply the transnational comparative framework of La Porta et al. to the comparative study in China. In terms of theoretical research, Lin XX et al. (1997) believed that indirect control or external governance realized through the competitive market is the most basic element of corporate governance structure. This assertion shows that an effective external governance environment is a prerequisite for the full functioning of internal governance. He also held that the governments of developing countries often encourage enterprises to enter the industries with intensive capital but no comparative advantages in order to pursue the advance of industry and technology, and the policy burden these enterprises must bear enables them to make contributions to regional economic development, employment, environmental protection as well as maintaining social stability.

Ｂｏｕｂａｋｒｉｅｔａｌ．（２０１１）的研究发现，相对于更低的政治掠夺风险环境中的企业而言，政治掠夺风险环境更高的企业的国有股权比例和风险承担水平之间呈现出更强的显著负相关关系。这说明更好的治理环境有利于提高国有企业的风险承担意愿。Ｂａｉｅｔａｌ．（２００６）的研究表明，在政府及官员干预下，中国的国有上市公司为了提供更多的就业岗位、缴纳更多的税费等目的，进行过度投资。Ｃｈｅｎｅｔａｌ．（２０１１）也发现政府干预降低了国有企业的投资效率。受西方国家学者关于外部治理环境研究的后发，我国学者将ＬａＰｏｒｔａｅｔａｌ．的跨国比较框架应用到我国地区的比较研究中。理论研究方面，林XX等（１９９７）认为，通过竞争市场实现的间接控制或外部治理才是公司治理结构中最基本的要素。这一论断表明有效的外部治理环境是内部治理功能充分发挥作用的前提。并认为发展中国家的政府经常为了追求产业和技术的先进性，鼓励企业进入资本过度密集而没有比较优势的产业，而这些企业必须承担的政策性负担使得企业要为区域经济发展、就业、环保以及维护社会稳定做贡献。

Li XX et al. (2000) argue that the current state of corporate governance in China is the coexistence of dual governance environment and dual governance, leading to widespread government intervention and political connection, which can easily evolve into government and business cooperation and government and business collusion, thus affecting the behavior of interests transmission of large shareholders Delivery behavior. Fan X et al. [18] used the principal component analysis method to obtain the contribution rate of each index and calculated the quantitative market-oriented composite index using the contribution rate and it has promoted the domestic study of the institutional environment. Simultaneously, they conducted in-depth study with these quantitative indexes, finding that listed companies controlled by the regional government are more likely to produce the phenomenon of over-investment, especially in regions with relatively high degree of government intervention. Xia XX et al. (2007), based on China's national conditions, believed that the external governance environment should include at least the relationship between government and the market, non-state-owned economic development, product market development, factor market development, market intermediary organizations development and legal environment and contract culture, etc. Luo XX et al. [23] found that in regions with higher degree of government intervention, establishing good relationship with the government can improve the efficiency of enterprises and reduce the transaction costs, thus enterprises are willing to establish political relations with the government. Therefore, in order to maintain a good political relationship with the government, enterprises will actively respond to the development plan of local officials and increase investment in enterprises, which even lead to over-investment. Wei XX [19] thought that the reason why government intervention may cause over-investment is due to China's special institutional environment and the governments will achieve their political objectives through the intervention of enterprises under their control, and there are no specific and clear boundaries to determine whether it is inefficient investment.

李XX等（２０００）认为当前的中国公司治理处于双重治理环境和双重治理者并存的状态，导致政府干预和政治关联普遍存在，而且极易演变为政商联合和政商合谋，从而影响了大股东的利益输送行为。樊X等[18]使用主分量分析法求出各指标的贡献率，利用贡献率计算得出了量化的市场化综合指数，推动了国内对制度环境的研究。同时，他们利用这些量化的指标深入研究，结果发现由地区政府控制的上市公司更容易产生过度投资现象，尤其是在政府干预程度相对较高的地区。夏XX等（２００７）则基于我国的国情，认为外部治理环境至少应包括政府与市场的关系、非国有经济发展、产品市场发育程度、要素市场发育程度、市场中介组织的发育和法律环境及契约文化等方面。罗XX等[23]发现在政府干预较强的地区，与政府建立良好的关系，可以提高企业办事效率，减少交易成本，所以企业愿意同政府建立政治关系。因此，为了保持与政府良好的政治关系，企业会积极响应地方官员的发展规划，加大企业的投资，甚至出现过度投资现象。魏XX[19]认为政府干预导致过度投资的原因在于我国特殊的制度环境，政府通过对其控制的企业进行干预来实现其政治目标，并没有具体、清晰的界限来判断其是否属于非效率投资。

Wang XX and Zhang XX (2007) examined the relationship between the governance environment and the quality of corporate information disclosure. They found that the higher the degree of marketization in the region of the listed companies, the smaller the degree of government intervention and the higher the quality of information disclosure. Peking University China Economic Research Center macro group [21] thought that the property rights constraints and local government performance view are the key factors leading to over-investment and inefficient investment. Li Wengui and Yu XX (2012) studied the impact of the process of marketization on the relationship between the nature of ownership and corporate risks. Zhou XX [22], based on the perspective of incentive and promotion system of local government officials, indicated that since the performance assessment standards of local officials include indexes such as gross domestic product and fiscal revenue, local officials have a very strong incentive to promote the rapid growth of the local economy. As a result, listed companies controlled by the government expand blindly in order to increase GDP or fiscal revenue, resulting in over-investment. Li XX et al. (2015) examined the direct relationship between the external governance environment and the investment efficiency of the listed companies from the aspects of government intervention, the level of development and the level of the rule of law, which found that for total number of sample companies, reducing the degree of government intervention , increasing the level of financial development and the level of the rule of law will help to improve the investment efficiency of listed companies; there is a positive correlation between the level of financial development and investment efficiency of non-state-owned listed companies. In the early stage of China's economic transition, the degree of government intervention, the level of financial development and the level of the rule of law are negatively correlated with the investment efficiency of state-owned listed companies.

王XX与张XX（２００７）考察了治理环境与企业信息披露质量之间的关系，发现上市公司所在地区的市场化程度越高、政府干预程度越小，信息披露质量就越高。北京大学中国经济研究中心宏观组[21]认为，产权约束和地方政府政绩观导向是导致过度投资和投资低效的关键因素。李文贵和余明桂（２０１２）研究了市场化进程对所有权性质与企业风险承担之间关系的影响作用。周XX[22]基于地方政府官员激励晋升制度的视角研究由于地方官员的政绩考核标准中有国内生产总值与财政收入等指标，导致地方官员有非常强烈的动机推动本地经济的快速增长，这使得政府控制的上市公司为了增加GDP或者财政收入而追求盲目扩张，导致过度投资。李XX等（２０１５）则从政府干预、金顯发展水平Ｗ及法治水平＝个维度检验了外部治理环境与上市公司投资效率之间的直接关系，研究发现：全样本公司中，降低政府干预程度、提高金融发展水平和法治水平有利于改善上市公司投资效率；金融发展水平和法治水平与非国有上市公司投资效率正相关；在我国经济转轨初期，政府干预程度、金融发展水平和法治水平与国有企业上市公司投资效率负相关。